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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the exact structure of continuous-action games
with non-parametric utility functions. We propose an `1 regularized method which encourages
sparsity of the coefficients of the Fourier transform of the recovered utilities. Our method works
by accessing very few Nash equilibria and their noisy utilities. Under certain technical conditions,
our method also recovers the exact structure of these utility functions, and thus, the exact
structure of the game. Furthermore, our method only needs a logarithmic number of samples in
terms of the number of players and runs in polynomial time. We follow the primal-dual witness
framework to provide provable theoretical guarantees.
1 Introduction
Game theory has been extensively used as a framework to model and study the strategic interactions
amongst rational but selfish individual players who are trying to maximize their payoffs. Game
theory has been applied in many fields including but not limited to social and political science,
economics, communication, system design and computer science. In non-cooperative games each
player decides its action based on the actions of others players. These games are characterized
by the equilibrium solution concept such as Nash equilibrium (NE) [18] which serves a descriptive
role of the stable outcome of the overall behavior of self-interested players (e.g., people, companies,
governments, groups or autonomous systems) interacting strategically with each other in distributed
settings.
Graphical games, introduced within the AI community about two decades ago, graphical
games [16], are a representation of multiplayer games which capture and exploit locality or sparsity
of direct influences. They are most appropriate for large-scale population games in which the payoffs
of each player are determined by the actions of only a small number of other players. Indeed,
graphical games played a prominent role in establishing the computational complexity of computing
NE in normal-form games as well as in succinctly representable multiplayer games (see, e.g., [5, 6, 7]
and the references therein). Graphical games have been studied for both discrete and continuous
actions.
Inference in Graphical Games. There has been a large body of work on computing classical
equilibrium solution concepts. The Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria [1] in graphical games
have been studied by [3, 16, 15, 19, 20, 27, 8, 26, 21, 22, 17]. The computation of the price of
anarchy was studied in [2]. In addition, [14] identified the most influential players, i.e., a small set
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of players whose collective behavior forces every other player to a unique choice of action. All the
works above focus on inference problems for graphical games, and fall in the field of algorithmic
game theory. All of these methods assume access to graphical game network and payoffs of the
games under consideration.
Learning Graphical Games. Consider an example of the following decision problem in a
marketplace where there are n producers selling k products. Each producer decides the production
quantity for a product based on its supply and demand in the market which could be treated as the
action vector for the producer. Each producer gauges the supply and demand by looking at the
production quantity of few other players which it considers its close competitors. The payoff for
a producer can be measured by its revenue. In order to answer the inference problems discussed
above, we would need to recover the structure of this graphical game. In particular we ask: Given
that we have access to a noisy observation of the player’s revenue and few joint action vectors at
equilibria, can we learn the neighbors of a player? Of course, once we learn the local structure for
each individual player then we can combine them in order to obtain the entire structure of the
graphical game. Learning the structure of a game is essential to the development, potential use and
success of game-theoretic models in large-scale practical applications. In this paper, we study the
problem of learning the graph structure in a continuous-action graphical game with non-parametric
utility functions.
Related Work. None of the prior literature has dealt with either continuous actions or non-
parametric utilities. In discrete-action games, [13] proposed a maximum-likelihood approach to learn
linear influence games - a class of parametric graphical games with binary actions and linear payoffs.
However, their method runs in exponential time and the authors assumed a specific observation
model for the strategy profiles. For the same specific observation model, [10] proposed a polynomial
time algorithm, based on `1-regularized logistic regression, for learning linear influence games. Their
strategy profiles (or joint actions) were drawn from a mixture of uniform distributions: one over
the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set, and the other over its complement. [11] obtained
necessary and sufficient conditions for learning linear influence games under arbitrary observation
model. [9] use a discriminative, max-margin based approach, to learn tree structured polymatrix
games1. Their method runs in exponential time and the authors show that learning polymatrix
games is NP-hard under this max-margin setting, even when the class of graphs is restricted to
trees. Finally, [12] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for learning sparse polymatrix games in
the discrete-action setting.
Contribution. We propose a novel method to learn graphical games with non-parametric payoffs.
To this end, we propose an `1-norm regularized method to learn graphical games, which encourages
sparsity of the coefficients of the Fourier transform of the recovered utilities. For n players, at most
d in-neighbors per player, we show that N “ Opd3 logpnqq samples are sufficient to recover the exact
structure of the true game. We also fully characterize a utility function which is at most  away
from the true utility function. We achieve the following goals in this paper:
1. Correctness - Our method correctly recovers the true structure of the graphical games.
2. Computational efficiency - Our method has a polynomial time complexity with respect to
the number of players and thus, can handle high dimensional cases.
1Polymatrix games are graphical games where each player’s utility is a sum of unary (single player) and pairwise
(two players) potential functions.
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3. Sample complexity - Our method achieves only a logarithmic sample complexity with
respect to the number of players.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce our notations and formally setup our problem.
2.1 Notation
Consider a directed graph GpV, Eq, where V and E are set of vertices and edges respectively. We
define V fi t1, . . . , nu, where each vertex corresponds to one player. We denote the in-neighbors of a
player i by Si, i.e., Si “ tj | pj, iq P Eu (i.e., the set of nodes that point to node i in the graph). All
the other players are denoted by Sci , i.e., S
c
i “ t1, . . . , nuzpSi Y tiuq. Let |Si| ď d and |Sci | ě n´ d.
For each player i P V, there is a set of actions or pure-strategies Ai. That is, player i can take
action xi P Ai. Each action xi consists of making k decisions on a limited budget b P R. We consider
games with continuous actions. Mathematically, xi P Ai “ Rk and }xi}2 ď b. We use x-i to denote
the collection of actions of all players but i. For each player i, there is also a local payoff function
ui : Ai ˆ pŚjPSi Ajq Ñ R mapping the joint action of player i and its in-neighbors Si, to a real
number. A joint action x˚ PŚiPV Ai is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of a graphical
game iff, no player i has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the prescribed action xi˚ P Ai,
given the joint action of its in-neighbors xS˚i P
Ś
jPSi Aj in the equilibrium. We denote a game by
G , and the set of all PSNE is denoted by NEpG q.
For a matrix A P Rpˆq and two sets S Ď t1, . . . , pu and T Ď t1, . . . , qu, AST denotes A restricted
to rows in S and columns in T . Similarly, AS. and A.T are row and column restricted matrices
respectively. For a vector m P Rq, the `8-norm is defined as }m}8 “ maxiPt1,...,pu |mi|. The
`8-operator norm for A is defined as }A}8,8 “ maxiPt1,...,pu
řq
j“1 |Aij |. The spectral norm of A is
defined as }A}2 “ sup}x}2“1 }Ax}2.
2.2 Model
Now we describe the basic setup of our problem. We consider a graphical game with the property
that utility function of each player i is decomposable into sum of pairwise functions which only
depend on the in-neighbors of i. In particular,
uipxq “
ÿ
jPSi
uijpxi, xjq (1)
where Si is the set of neighbors of player i.
For two real valued functions fpxq and gpxq on the domain x P X , we define their inner product
as
xf , gy “
ż
xPX
fpxqgpxqdx . (2)
We denote L2 norm of fpxq as
}f}2 “
dż
xPX
f2pxqdx . (3)
3
Using the above definitions, it is useful to express our model in the basis functions. Let ψkp., .q,@k “
t1, . . . ,8u be a set of uniformly bounded, orthonormal basis functions such that
uijpxi, xjq “
8ÿ
k“0
βi˚jkψkpxi, xjq (4)
where βi˚jk “ xuij , ψky. We assume that for all i, j P t1, . . . , nu, i ‰ j, the weight magnitudes|βi˚jk|,@k P tr ` 1, . . . ,8u form a convergent series for a sufficiently large r. For example, for large
enough r, Fourier coefficients of a periodic and twice continuously differentiable function form a
convergent series [25]. For all i, j P t1, . . . , nu we assume that supxiPAi,xjPAj |ψkpxi, xjq| ď ψ. We
assume that we have access to a set of joint actions x and the corresponding noisy payoff for each
player.
We define a local setup where we learn the in-neighbors of a player by having access to its
perturbed payoff and perturbed basis functions. This allows us to apply our method in a distributed
setting where in-neighbors for each node are recovered independently and combined later to get the
complete structure of the graphical game.
2.3 Sampling Mechanism
Treating the outcomes of the game as “samples” observed across multiple “plays” of the same game
is a recurring theme in the literature for learning games [13, 11, 12]. All of these works assume
access to Nash equilibria and a noise mechanism. Noise could be added to each player’s strategy at
a local level or by mixing the sample with a non-Nash equilibria set at a global level. Since none of
the prior literature has dealt with either continuous actions or non-parametric utilities, we propose
a novel sampling mechanism. We assume that we have noisy black-box access to payoffs. For a joint
action x the blackbox outputs a noisy payoff ruipxq. The blackbox computes this noisy payoff by
first computing noisy basis function values rψkpxi, xjq and then finally taking their weighted sum to
get the final noisy payoff.
Mathematically,
rψkpxi, xjq “ ψkpxi, xjq ` γkpxi, xjq (5)
where γkpxi, xjq are independent zero mean sub-Gaussian noise with variance proxy σ2. The class
of sub-Gaussian random variables includes for instance Gaussian random variables, any bounded
random variable (e.g. Bernoulli, multinomial, uniform), any random variable with strictly log-
concave density, and any finite mixture of sub-Gaussian variables. Thus, using sub-Gaussian noise
makes our setup quite general in nature. Correspondingly, the resulting noisy payoff function that
we observe can be written as follows:
ruipxq “ ÿ
jPSi
ruijpxi, xjq “ ÿ
jPSi
8ÿ
k“0
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq (6)
where
ruijpxi, xjq “ 8ÿ
k“0
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq . (7)
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Estimation. Let uijpxi, xjq be our estimation of uijpxi, xjq. Ideally, we would like to estimate an
infinitely long vector with entries indexed by pj, kq for j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰ i and k P t1, . . . ,8u for
every player i. However, this is impractical with finite computing resources. Rather, we estimate
an pn ´ 1q ˆ r dimensional vector β with entries indexed by pj, kq for j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰ i and
k P t1, . . . , ru for every player i. Using these finite number of coefficients, we estimate pairwise
utility in the following manner,
uijpxi, xjq “
rÿ
k“0
βijkψkpxi, xjq (8)
and thus, the resulting estimation of the utility function is:
uipxq “
ÿ
jPSi
rÿ
k“0
βijkψpxi, xjq (9)
3 Theoretical Results
In this section, we setup our estimation problem and prove our theoretical results. We also mention
some technical assumptions in this section which we will use in our proofs. Let D be a collection of
N independent samples. We estimate β˚ by solving the following optimization problem in sample
setting for some λ ą 0:
min
β
1
N
ÿ
xPD
pruipxq ´ uipxqq2 ` λÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|
such that
ÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk| ď C
(10)
where C ą 0 is a constant that acts as a budget on the coefficients βijk to ensure that they
are not unbounded. We would like to prove that βijk “ 0,@j R Si and βijk ‰ 0,@j P Si. This
gives us a straight forward way of picking in-neighbors of player i by solving optimization problem
(10). We use an auxiliary variable w “ řj‰iřrk“0 |βijk| and prove the following lemma to get
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions at the optimum.
Lemma 1 (KKT conditions). The following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions hold at the
optimal solution of the optimization problem (10):
Stationarity:
B
Bβ
“ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2‰` λz “ 0
Primal Feasibility: w ď C
w “
ÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|
Dual Feasibility: λ ě 0
(11)
where z P Rrpn´1qˆ1indexed by pj, kq, j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰ i, k P t1, . . . , ru. It is defined as follows:
zijk “
#
signpβijkq, if βijk ‰ 0
r´1, 1s, otherwise (12)
(Check Appendix A for details.)
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3.1 Assumptions
In this subsection, we will discuss the key technical assumptions which are required for our theoretical
results. For notational clarity, we define the following two quantities:
H fi
1
N
ÿ
xPD
ψpxqψpxqᵀ
pH fi 1
N
ÿ
xPD
`
ψpxqψpxqᵀ `ψpxqγpxqᵀ˘ (13)
It should be noted that pH “ E`H˘. For our first assumption, we want H restricted to in-neighbors
to be an invertible matrix. Formally,
Assumption 1. We assume that H is positive definite matrix, i.e., Λminp
“
H
‰
SiSi
q “ Cmin ą 0
where Λmin denotes the minimum eigenvalue.
This assumption readily implies that pH is invertible with sufficient number of samples N . More
technically,
Lemma 2. If Λminp
“
H
‰
SiSi
q “ Cmin ą 0 then Λminp
“ pH‰
SiSi
q “ Cmin ´  for some  ą 0 with
probability at least expp´N2
2b2σ2
`Oprdqq.
(Check Appendix B for details.)
The above lemma ensures that our optimization problem (10) has a unique solution and all our
theoretical guarantees hold for this particular solution. As for our second assumption, we require
that non-in-neighbors of a player do not affect the player’s action too much. We achieve this by
proposing a mutual incoherence assumption.
Assumption 2. We assume that }|“H‰
SciSi
“
H
‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ď 1´ α for some 0 ă α ă 1.
As with Assumption 1, it can be shown easily that with enough number of samples Assumption
2 is satisfied in sample setting with sufficient number of samples N .
Lemma 3. If }|“H‰
SciSi
“
H
‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ď 1´ α for some 0 ă α ă 1 then }|
“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ď 1´ α2
with probability at least 1 ´ expp ´KNC2minα2p1´αq2r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn ´ dqdqq ´ expp ´Nα6r2d2 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn ´
dqdqq ´ expp ´2N
b2σ2C2min
`Oprdqq ´ 2 expp ´Nα2
24r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logpr2d2qq for a constant K ą 0.
(Check Appendix C for details.)
While mutual incoherence is new to graphical games with continuous actions and non-parametric
utilities, it has been a standard assumption in various estimation problems such as compressed
sensing [28], Markov random fields [24], non-parametric regression [23], diffusion networks [4], among
others.
Assumption 3. We assume that minjPSi |βi˚jk| ą ∆pλ,Cmin, dq where
∆pλ,Cmin, dq “ 2λ
Cmin
p2?d` 1a|Si| q
The minimum weight assumption is a standard practice in the literature employing the primal-
dual witness technique [28, 24]. This assumption ensures that the coefficients βi˚jk are not arbitrarily
close to zero which can make inference very difficult for any method.
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3.2 Primal-Dual Witness Method
We use primal-dual witness framework [28] to prove our theoretical results. We note that βi˚jk “
0,@j ‰ Si. We also assume that βijk “ 0,@j ‰ Si. As first step of our proof, we will justify this
choice. Then we bound the Euclidean norm distance between the estimated β and the true β˚.
Subsequently, we show that if the non-zero entries in β˚ satisfy a minimum weight criteria then the
recovered β matches β˚ up to its sign. This allows us to identify the in-neighbors for each player.
Theorem 1. Consider a continuous-action graphical game G such that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are
satisfied for each player and payoff function for each player is decomposable according to Equation
(1). Let λ ą gpψ, n, δ,N, d, C, αq and N “ Op sψ2σ2C2δr3d3
2
logprnqq, then we prove the following
claims by solving the optimization problem (10).
1. We recover the correct set of non-neighbors for each player i.
2. We recover the exact structure of the graphical game G .
3. Furthermore, we estimate a payoff function which is  close to the true payoff by by estimating
β for each player i by solving the optimization problem (10).
where Cmin is the minimum eigenvalue of
“
H
‰
SiSi
and δ is an arbitrary parameter which depends on
r.
The functions gp¨q is defined as follows:
gpψ, n, δ,N, d, C, αq “ max `20?2ψcdδ log d
N
, 10
?
2σψC
c
log d
N
,
20
?
2ψ
1´ α2
c
dδ logpn´ dq
N
,
10
?
2σψC
1´ α2
c
logpn´ dq
N
˘
By doing some simple algebraic manipulation it is easy to see that,
1
N
ÿ
xPD
pruipxq ´ uipxqq2 “ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
ppβ˚ ´ βqᵀ rψ `ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq ` βᵀγpxqq2 (14)
Here, β˚ P Rrpn´1qˆ1, rψ P Rrpn´1qˆ1 and γ P Rrpn´1qˆ1 are indexed by pj, kq, j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰
i, k P t1, . . . , ru. Thus Stationarity KKT condition of Equation (38) becomes:
2
N
ÿ
xPD
pγ ´ rψpxqqp rψpxqᵀpβ˚ ´ βq `ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq ` γᵀpxqβq ` λz “ 0
Let β “
„
βSi
βSci

, where βSi contains the entries βijk ‰ 0 and βSci contains the entries βijk “ 0. From
the above, we have
2
N
ÿ
xPD
pγ ´ rψpxqqp rψSipxqᵀpβS˚i ´ βSiq `ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq ` γᵀSipxqβSiq ` λz “ 0
Separating the indices for the support (in-neighbors) and the non-support, we can write the above
equation in two parts. The first for the indices in the support,
2
N
ÿ
xPD
´ψSipxqp rψSipxqᵀpβS˚i ´ βSiq `ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq ` γᵀSipxqβSiq ` λzSi “ 0 (15)
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and the second for the indices in the non-support,
2
N
ÿ
xPD
´ψSci pxqp rψSipxqᵀpβS˚i ´ βSiq `ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq ` γᵀSipxqβSiq ` λzSci “ 0 . (16)
We make use of Assumption 1 and rearrange Equation (15) to get,
βS˚i ´ βSi “ ´p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq rψSipxqᵀq-1pÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq ´ pÿ
xPD
ψSipxq rψSipxqᵀq-1
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq ` λp
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq rψSipxqᵀq-1zSi
(17)
Substituting Equation (17) in Equation (16) and rearranging the terms we get,
λzSci “ ´
2
N
“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq ´ 2
N
“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyqγᵀSipyqβSiq`
λ
2
N
“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
zSi `
2
N
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq ` 2
N
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi
Using the triangle norm inequality and noting that }Ab}8 ď |||A|||8}b}8, we obtain
λ}zSci }8 ď
2
N
|||“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
|||8}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ` 2
N
|||“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
|||8
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyqγᵀSipyqβSiq}8 ` λ
2
N
|||“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
|||8}zSi}8 `
2
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq}8`
2
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8
(18)
Using Assumption 2 and noting that }zSi}8 ď 1, we have
λ}zSci }8 ď p1´
α
2
q 2
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ` p1´ α
2
q 2
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyqγᵀSipyqβSiq}8
` λ 2
N
p1´ α
2
q ` 2
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjq}8 ` 2
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8
(19)
We want to show that }zSci }8 ă 1, which ensures that βijk “ 0,@j R Si. We do this by bounding
each term in Equation (19) using the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. For some  ą 0, we have
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8 ě q ď 2pn´ dq expp
´N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (20)
as well as
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyqγᵀSipyqβSi}8 ě q ď 2d expp
´N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (21)
8
(Check Appendix D for details.)
Lemma 5. For sufficiently large r and  ą 0, we have
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ě 2q ď 2d expp´ N2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (22)
as well as
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSci pyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ě 2q ď 2pn´ dq expp´ N2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (23)
where δ ą 0 is an arbitrary constant which depends on r.
(Check Appendix E for details.)
Combining all the results together,
λ}zSci }8 ďp1´
α
2
q41 ` p1´ α
2
q22 ` λ 2
N
p1´ α
2
q ` 43 ` 24 (24)
We take 1 ď λ20 , 2 ď λ10 , 3 ď p1´ α2 q λ20 and 4 ď p1´ α2 q λ10 . Then for N ě 10, we have
λ}zSci }8 ď p1´
α
2
qλ
}zSci }8 ď 1´
α
2
(25)
which justifies our choice that βijk “ 0,@j ‰ Si. The choice of i,@i P t1, . . . , 4u imposes
restrictions on choice of λ for the concentration bounds to hold with high probability. In particular,
we need
λ ě max `20?2ψcdδ log d
N
, 10
?
2σψC
c
log d
N
,
20
?
2ψ
1´ α2
c
dδ logpn´ dq
N
,
10
?
2σψC
1´ α2
c
logpn´ dq
N
˘
(26)
3.3 Estimation Error
Now that we have a criteria for choosing the regularization parameter λ, we can put an upper bound
on the estimation error between β and β˚. We know from equation (17) that,
}βS˚i ´ βSi}2 “ } ´
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq ´ “ pH‰-1SiSip 1N ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq`
λ
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
1
N
zSi}2
Using triangle norm inequality and noticing that }Ax}2 ď }A}2}x}2, where }A}2 is the spectral
norm of matrix A, we can write
}βS˚i ´ βSi}2 ď }
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
}2} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq}2 ` }“ pH‰-1SiSi}2} 1N pÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSi
q}2 ` λ}
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
}2} 1
N
zSi}2
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We have already shown that Λminp
“ pH‰
SiSi
q ě Cmin2 . It follows that Λminp
“ pH‰-1
SiSi
q ď 2Cmin . We also
note that }zSi}2 ď
a|Si|}zSi}8 ďa|Si|. Thus,
}βS˚i ´ βSi}2 ď
2
Cmin
p} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq}2 ` } 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq}2 ` λ
1a|Si| q
(27)
It remains to show that } 1N p
ř
xPD ψSipxq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jk rψkpxi, xjqq}2 and } 1N přxPD ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq}2
are bounded which we will do in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For some  ą 0,
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq}2 ě q ď 2d expp
´N2
2σ2d sψ2C2 q (28)
and
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq}2 ě q ď 2d expp ´N2
2d sψ2dδ q (29)
where δ ą 0 could be an arbitrary constant which depends on r.
(Check Appendix F for details.)
Using results from Lemma 6, we can rewrite Equation (27) as,
}βS˚i ´ βSi}2 ď
2
Cmin
p1 ` 2 ` λ 1a|Si| q (30)
Substituting 1 “
?
dλ and 2 “
?
dλ we get,
}βS˚i ´ βSi}2 ď
2λ
Cmin
p2?d` 1a|Si| q (31)
Note that }βS˚i ´ βSi}8 ď }βS˚i ´ βSi}2, thus
}βS˚i ´ βSi}8 ď
2λ
Cmin
p2?d` 1a|Si| q (32)
Equation (32) provides a minimum weight criteria, i.e., if minjPSi |βj˚ | ě ∆pλ,Cmin, dq “ 2λCmin p2
?
d`
1?|Si|q then we recover β
˚ up to correct sign. This ensures that we recover the exact structure of
the true game.
3.4 Recovering Payoffs.
In this subsection, we show that the recovered payoff function puipxq is not far away from the true
payoff function ui˚ pxq. To that end we provide a bound between the recovered payoff function and
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the true payoff function.
|ui˚ pxq ´ puipxq| “ | ÿ
jPSi
8ÿ
k“0
βi˚jkψkpxi, xjq ´
ÿ
jPSi
rÿ
k“0
βijkψkpxi, xjq|
“ |
ÿ
jPSi
rÿ
k“0
pβi˚jk ´ βijkqψkpxi, xjq `
ÿ
jPSi
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkψkpxi, xjq|
ď }βS˚i ´ βSi}2}ψSi}2 ` sψδ
ď 2λ
Cmin
p2?d` 1a|Si| q?d sψ ` sψδ
“ pλ,Cmin, d, sψ, δq
It follows that the recovered payoff function is pλ,Cmin, d, sψ, δq away from the true payoff function.
Furthermore, their distance decreases as we choose smaller λ and smaller δ. This can be done by
increasing the number of samples and the parameter r respectively.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an l1-regularized method which recovers the exact structure of true
game under minimum weight criteria by learning a finite dimensional vector. We also showed that
we recover a payoff function which is  close to the true payoff function. All of our high probability
statements hold as long as N “ Op sψ2σ2C2δr3d3
2
logprnqq. Furthermore, our method solves a convex
optimization problem and thus it runs in polynomial time.
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Note: Please see Appendix G for experimental results on real-world data.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 [KKT conditions] The following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions hold at the
optimal solution of the optimization problem (10):
Stationarity:
B
Bβ
“ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2‰` λz “ 0
Primal Feasibility: w ď C
w “
ÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|
Dual Feasibility: λ ě 0
(33)
where z P Rrpn´1qˆ1indexed by pj, kq, j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰ i, k P t1, . . . , ru. It is defined as follows:
zijk “
#
signpβijkq, if βijk ‰ 0
r´1, 1s, otherwise (34)
Proof. Equivalently,
min
β
1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2 ` λw
such that w ď C
w “
ÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|
The Lagrangian for the above can be written as,
Lpβ, w;µ, ηq “ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2 ` λw ` µpw ´ Cq ` ηpw ´ÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|q (35)
where µ ě 0. Alternatively,
Lpβ, w;µ, ηq “ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2 ` λw ` µpw ´ Cq ` ηpw ´ zᵀβq (36)
Here, β P Rrpn´1qˆ1, z P Rrpn´1qˆ1 with all of them indexed by pj, kq, j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰ i, k P
t1, . . . , ru. Vector z P Rrpn´1qˆ1 is defined as follows:
zijk “
#
signpβijkq, if βijk ‰ 0
r´1, 1s, otherwise (37)
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By writing the KKT conditions from the Lagrangian in Equation (36), a solution is optimal if and
only if:
Stationarity:
B
Bβ
“ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2‰´ ηz “ 0
λ` µ` η “ 0
Complimentarity: µpw ´ Cq “ 0
Primal Feasibility: w ď C
w “
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|
Dual Feasibility: µ ě 0
(38)
If we choose µ “ 0, then the following KKT conditions must hold at the optimal solution:
Stationarity:
B
Bβ
“ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
prupxq ´ upxqq2‰` λz “ 0
Primal Feasibility: w ď C
w “
ÿ
j‰i
rÿ
k“0
|βijk|
(39)
B Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 If Λminp
“
H
‰
SiSi
q “ Cmin ą 0 then Λminp
“ pH‰
SiSi
q “ Cmin ´  for some  ą 0 with
probability at least expp´N2
2b2σ2
`Oprdqq.
Proof. Let Cˆmin is minimum eigenvalue of pHSiSi . Then,
Cˆmin “ min
y,}y}2“1
yᵀ pHSiSiy
“ min
y,}y}2“1
yᵀHy ` yᵀ 1
N
ÿ
xPD
rψpxqγpxqᵀsSiSiy
ě Cmin ` min
y,}y}2“1
yᵀ
1
N
ÿ
xPD
rψpxqγpxqᵀsSiSiy
(40)
For some y such that }y}2 “ 1, we have a random variable R fi yᵀ 1N
ř
xPDrψpxqγpxqᵀsSiSiy, then R
is a zero mean sub-Gaussian random variable with variance proxy
řN
s“1 a2sσ2
N2
. Then using the tail
bound for sub-Gaussian random variables, we can write
PrpR ď ´q ď expp ´
2
2
řN
s“1 a2sσ2
N2
q (41)
We assume that }ψ}2 ď b, then maxy,}y}2“1 as ď b. Thus,
PrpR ď ´q ď expp´N
2
2b2σ2
q (42)
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Using the -nets argument and taking a union bound across exppOprdqq y of the net, we can
write
PrpR ď ´q ď expp´N
2
2b2σ2
`Oprdqq (43)
Clearly, if N “ Op8b2σ2
C2min
rdq we have Cˆmin ě Cmin2 with high probability.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 If }|“H‰
SciSi
“
H
‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ď 1´ α for some 0 ă α ă 1 then }|
“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ď 1´ α2
with probability at least 1 ´ expp ´KNC2minα2p1´αq2r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn ´ dqdqq ´ expp ´Nα6r2d2 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn ´
dqdqq ´ expp ´2N
b2σ2C2min
`Oprdqq ´ 2 expp ´Nα2
24r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logpr2d2qq for a constant K ą 0.
Proof. We start the proof by first proving one auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 7. For any δ ą 0, the following holds:
Prp}|“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
}|8 ě δq ď expp ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
` logp2r2pn´ dqdqq (44)
Prp}|“ pH‰
SiSi
´ “H‰
SiSi
}|8 ě δq ď expp´ ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
` logp2r2d2qq (45)
Prp}|“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ě δq ď expp ´2N
b2σ2C2min
`Oprdqq ` 2 expp ´Nδ
2
4r3d3ψ
2
σ2
` logpr2d2qq (46)
Proof. Note that,
r“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
sjk “ r 1
N
ÿ
xPD
“
ψpxqγpxqᵀ‰
SciSi
sjk (47)
We further note that the random variable r 1N
ř
xPD
“
ψpxqγpxqᵀ‰
SciSi
sjk is a zero mean sub-Gaussian
random variable with variance proxy
σ2
ř
xPD ψpxq2j
N2
. Thus,
Prp|r 1
N
ÿ
xPD
“
ψpxqγpxqᵀ‰
SciSi
sjk| ě q ď 2 expp ´
2
σ2
ř
xPD ψpxq2j
N2
q ď 2 expp´´N
2
ψ
2
σ2
q (48)
Taking  “ rd , we have
Prp|r 1
N
ÿ
xPD
“
ψpxqγpxqᵀ‰
SciSi
sjk| ě 
rd
q ď 2 expp´ ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
q (49)
We observe that,
}|“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
}|8 “ max
jPSci
ÿ
kPSi
|r 1
N
ÿ
xPD
“
ψpxqγpxqᵀ‰
SciSi
sjk (50)
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Thus, taking a union bound across j P Sci and k P Si, we get
Prp}|“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
}|8 ě q ď 2r2pn´ dqd expp´ ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
q
“ expp ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
` logp2r2pn´ dqdqq
(51)
Similarly,
}|“ pH‰
SiSi
´ “H‰
SiSi
}|8 “ max
jPSi
ÿ
kPSi
|r 1
N
ÿ
xPD
“
ψpxqγpxqᵀ‰
SiSi
sjk (52)
It follows that,
Prp}|“ pH‰
SiSi
´ “H‰
SiSi
}|8 ě q ď 2r2d2 expp ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
q
“ expp´ ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
` logp2r2d2qq
(53)
Now,
}|“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
}|8 “ }|
“
H
‰´1
SiSi
r“H‰
SiSi
´ “ pH‰
SiSi
s“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|8
ď ?dr}|“H‰´1
SiSi
r“H‰
SiSi
´ “ pH‰
SiSi
s“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|2
ď ?dr}|“H‰´1
SiSi
}|2}|r
“
H
‰
SiSi
´ “ pH‰
SiSi
s}|2}|
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|2
ď
?
dr
Cmin
}|r“H‰
SiSi
´ “ pH‰
SiSi
s}|2}|
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|2
(54)
We have shown that,
Prp}|“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|2 ě 2
Cmin
q ď expp ´
2
2b2σ2
`Oprdqq (55)
Moreover,
Prp}|r“H‰
SiSi
´ “ pH‰
SiSi
s}|2 ě q ď 2 expp ´N
2
r2d2ψ
2
σ2
` logpr2d2qq (56)
Taking  “ δ
2
?
dr
, we have
Prp}|r“H‰
SiSi
´ “ pH‰
SiSi
s}|2 ě δ
2
?
dr
q ď 2 expp ´Nδ
2
4r3d3ψ
2
σ2
` logpr2d2qq (57)
and furthermore
Prp}|“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
}|8 ě δq ď expp ´2N
b2σ2C2min
`Oprdqq ` 2 expp ´Nδ
2
4r3d3ψ
2
σ2
` logpr2d2qq (58)
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Now we are ready to prove the main lemma.“ pH‰
SciSi
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
“ T1 ` T2 ` T3 ` T4 (59)
where
T1 fi
“
H
‰
SciSi
r“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
s,
T2 fi r
“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
s“H‰´1
SiSi
T3 fi r
“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
sr“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
s,
T4 fi
“
H
‰
SciSi
“
H
‰´1
SiSi
(60)
We know that }|T4}|8 ď 1´ α. Now,
}|T1}|8 “ }|
“
H
‰
SciSi
r“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
s}|8
ď }|“H‰
SciSi
“
H
‰´1
SiSi
}|8}|
“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
}|8}|
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
}|8
ď p1´ αq}|“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
}|8
?
rd}“ pH‰
SiSi
}2
ď p1´ αq}|“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
}|8
?
rd
2
Cmin
ď α
6
(61)
The last step holds with probability at least 1´expp ´NC2minα2
144p1´αq2r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn´dqdqq by choosing
δ “ Cminα
12p1´αq?rd in equation (44).
For the second term,
}|T2}|8 ď
?
rd}|“H‰´1
SiSi
}|2}|r
“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
s}|8
ď
?
rd
Cmin
}|r“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
s}|8
ď α
6
(62)
The last step holds with probability at least 1 ´ expp ´NC2minα2
36r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn ´ dqdqq by choosing
δ “ Cminα
6
?
rd
.
For the third term,
}|T3}|8 ď }|r
“ pH‰
SciSi
´ “H‰
SciSi
s}|8}|r
“ pH‰´1
SiSi
´ “H‰´1
SiSi
s}|8
ď α
6
(63)
The last step holds with probability at least 1´ expp ´Nα
6r2d2 sψ2σ2 ` logp2r2pn´ dqdqq ´ expp ´2Nb2σ2C2min `
Oprdqq ´ 2 expp ´Nα2
24r3d3 sψ2σ2 ` logpr2d2qq by choosing δ “aα6 in equations (44) and (46).
Combining all the terms together, we get the final result.
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D Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 For some  ą 0, we have
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8 ě q ď 2pn´ dq expp
´N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (64)
as well as
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyqγᵀSipyqβSi}8 ě q ď 2d expp
´N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (65)
Proof. Let Rpxq fi ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi be a random variable and Rjpxq be the jth entry of Rpxq. Then
Rjpxq “ ψSci pxqjγᵀSipxqβSi . Now note that γSipxq is a zero mean sub-Gaussian random variable with
variance proxy σ2Idˆd. Thus, γᵀSipxqβSi is also a zero mean sub-Gaussian random variable with
variance proxy σ2}βSi}22 and Rjpxq is a zero mean sub-Gaussian random variable with variance proxy
σ2ψSci pxq2j}βSi}22. For a given β, using a concentration bound for sub-Gaussian random variables,
we can write the following:
Prp|Rjpxq| ě |βq ď 2 expp´ 
2
2σ2ψSci pxq2j}βSi}22
q (66)
Note that from Equation (38), }β}1 ď C ùñ }β}22 ď C2. Thus,
Prp|Rjpxq| ě |βq ď 2 expp´ 
2
2σ2ψSci pxq2jC2
q (67)
Let maxx,j ψpxqj “ ψ, then
Prp|Rjpxq| ě |βq ď 2 expp´ 
2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (68)
Note that given β, Rjpxq|β,@x P D are mutually independent. Also note that Prp 1N
ř
xPD |Rjpxq| ě
q ě Prp 1N |
ř
xPD Rjpxq| ě q, we get:
Prp 1
N
|
ÿ
xPD
Rjpxq| ě |βq ď 2 expp´ N
2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (69)
Again taking a union bound across j P Sci , we get
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8 ě |βq ď 2pn´ dq expp´
N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (70)
Computing the expectation with respect to β, we get
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
xPD
ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8 ě q ď 2pn´ dq expp´
N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (71)
Thus 1N }
ř
xPD ψSci pxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8 concentrates around  as long as N “ Opσ
2ψ
2
C2 logpn´dq
2
q.
Following the arguments similar to the previous proof, we can write that
Prp 1
N
}
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyqγᵀSipyqβSi}8 ě q ď 2d expp´
N2
2σ2ψ
2
C2
q (72)
Thus 1N }
ř
yPD ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSi}8 concentrates around  as long as N “ Opσ
2ψ
2
C2 log d
2
q.
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E Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 For sufficiently large r and  ą 0, we have
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ě 2q ď 2d expp´ N2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (73)
as well as
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSci pyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ě 2q ď 2pn´ dq expp´ N2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (74)
where δ ą 0 is an arbitrary constant which depends on r.
Proof.
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ď }pÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq}8`
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkγkpyi, yjqq}8
(75)
We will bound both the terms separately.
Bound on 1N }p
ř
yPD ψSipyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq}8. LetR fi p
ř
yPD ψSipyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq
be a random variable. Let lth entry of R be Rl, i.e., Rl “ přyPD ψSipyqlřj‰iř8k“r`1 βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq.
|p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyql
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq| ď p
ÿ
yPD
|ψSipyql|
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
|βi˚jk||ψkpyi, yjq|q
ď p
ÿ
yPD
|ψ|
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
|βi˚jk||ψ|q
ď N |ψ|2
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
|βi˚jk|
(76)
Let rαijks8k“1 be a convergent series with positive entries such that |βi˚jk| ď αijk,@k ě r ` 1. To
give an example, let βi˚jk be the Fourier coefficients, then we can choose αijk “ Dk2 for some D ą 0.
Then it holds that |βijk| ď Dk2 ,@k ě r ` 1 for sufficiently large r.
Lemma 8. For sufficiently large r,
ř8
k“r`1 |βi˚jk| ď δ for any δ ą 0.
Proof. The tail sum of a convergent series goes to 0, i.e., for sufficiently large r,
8ÿ
k“r`1
αi˚jk ď δ (77)
It readily follows that
ř8
k“r`1 |βi˚jk| ď δ.
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Using Lemma 8 and taking δ “ 
d|ψ|2 , it follows that:
|p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyql
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq| ď N (78)
This ensures that for large enough r, we have
1
N }p
ř
yPD ψSipyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jkψkpyi, yjqq}8 ď .
Bound on 1N }p
ř
yPD ψSipyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jkγkpyi, yjqq}8. Let R be a random variable such that
R fi ψSipyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jkγkpyi, yjq. Let the l-th entry ofR beRl “ ψSipyql
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jkγkpyi, yjq.
For given β˚, Rl is a zero mean sub-Gaussian random variable with variance proxyψSipyq2
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1pβi˚jkq2.
Note that since αijk is convergent series with positive entries, α
2
ijk is also convergent. This means
that using the tail sum of a convergent series
8ÿ
k“r`1
α2ijk ď δ (79)
for sufficiently large r and any δ ą 0. It follows that
8ÿ
k“r`1
pβi˚jkq2 ď δ (80)
Also, note that Rl|β˚ are mutually independent for y P D. Thus
Prp 1
N
|Rl| ě |β˚q ď 2 expp´ N
2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (81)
Taking a union bound across l P Si, we get
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkγkpyi, yjqq}8 ě |β˚q ď 2d expp´ N
2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (82)
Computing the expectation with respect to β˚, we get
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jkγkpyi, yjqq}8 ě q ď 2d expp´ N
2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (83)
where δ is an arbitrary constant which depends on r.
Combining above results,
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSipyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ě 2q ď 2d expp´ N2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (84)
Thus if N “ Opψ2dδ log d
2
q is sufficient for 1N }p
ř
yPD ψSipyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jk rψpyi, yjqq}8 to concen-
trate around 2. Using the similar argument as the previous proof, we can write
Prp 1
N
}p
ÿ
yPD
ψSci pyq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψpyi, yjqq}8 ě 2q ď 2pn´ dq expp´ N2
2ψ
2
dδ
q (85)
where δ could be arbitrarily small depending on r. Thus if N “ Opψ2dδ logpn´dq
2
q is sufficient for
1
N }p
ř
yPD ψSci pyq
ř
j‰i
ř8
k“r`1 βi˚jk rψpyi, yjqq}8 to concentrate around 2.
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F Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 For some  ą 0,
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq}2 ě q ď 2d expp
´N2
2σ2d sψ2C2 q (86)
and
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq}2 ě q ď 2d expp ´N2
2d sψ2dδ q (87)
where δ ą 0 could be an arbitrary small constant which depends on r.
Proof. Following the notations used in Lemma 4, we know that
Prp| 1
N
ÿ
xPD
Rjpxq| ě  | βq ď 2 expp ´N
2
2σ2 sψ2C2 q (88)
We take  “ ?
d
and apply a union bound over j P Si, we get
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq}2 ě  | βq ď 2d expp
´N2
2σ2d sψ2C2 q (89)
Computing the expectation with respect to β,
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxqγᵀSipxqβSiq}2 ě q ď 2d expp
´N2
2σ2d sψ2C2 q (90)
Similarly, using notations used in Lemma 5, we know that
Prp 1
N
|Rl| ě  | β˚q ď 2 expp´N
2
2 sψ2dδ q (91)
where δ ą 0 is an arbitrary parameter which depends on r. We take  “ ?
d
and union bound over
l P Si and get
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq}2 ě |β˚q ď 2d expp ´N2
2d sψ2dδ q (92)
Taking expectation with respect to β˚, we get
Prp} 1
N
p
ÿ
xPD
ψSipxq
ÿ
j‰i
8ÿ
k“r`1
βi˚jk
rψkpxi, xjqq}2 ě q ď 2d expp ´N2
2d sψ2dδ q (93)
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Figure 1: Influence of various European countries on potato trade between 1973 ´ 2019. The
influence of a country is measured by the number of its out-neighbors in the learnt game.
G Application - Identifying Countries Influencing Potato Trade
in Europe
In this section, we performed a computational experiment on real world data to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our method. We used our method to identify a set of European countries which have
influenced potato trade within Europe between 1973´2019. The trading interactions among various
countries can be modeled as a non-parametric strategic game among self-interested countries.
Our experiments were conducted on the publicly available potato trade data from https:
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/agriculture/data/database. We extracted the potato trade
data among n “ 31 European countries between 1973 to 2019. Each training sample corresponds to
a year, and thus, we had T “ 47 samples for our experiments. The dataset contains the country-
wise production volume of potato for 47 years which we treated as the action x of players. The
dataset also contains country-wise trade prices of potato for 47 years which we treated as payoffruipxq for each country. We chose r “ 16 basis functions for the Fourier series expansion of each
pairwise utility function to run our experiments. In particular, for each pairwise utility function
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suijpxi, xjq,@i, j P t1, . . . , nu, i ‰ j, we chose the basis functions from the following set:
ψkpxi, xjq P
ď
l,mPt1,2u
tcosp2pilxiq cosp2pimxjq, cosp2pilxiq sinp2pimxjq, sinp2pilxiq cosp2pimxjq,
sinp2pilxiq sinp2pimxjqu
(94)
We computed the influence of the countries by first learning the global graphical game and then
computing the number of out-neighbors for each country in the learnt game. The results are shown
in Figure 1. We observe that many of the central and southern European countries along with
Iceland and Portugal have had high influence in the European potato market .
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